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When a 260-year-old regime comes toppling down, how do you organize society after the 
fall? That is the challenge that faced members of the Meiji state after the end of the Tokugawa 
Bakufu. The need for internal unity and the pressure of Western Imperialism, as imposed by the 
Unequal Treaties,1 raised the stakes of the Meiji State’s goal: to create a modern nation-state 
with a unifying national identity. What did that process entail? First, create a legal precedent for 
control and monopolize violence. Second, define the individual because a nation needs a public, 
and a public cannot exist without people. Third, negotiate the relationship between the freedom 
of the individual and the power of the State in the connective process of state-building. Frictions 
between individual and state, single or multiple, and truth or the absence of it emerged. This 
thesis argues that fighting over those tensions became the defining act of modernity and the 
foundation of Meiji Japan.  
This project analyzes the ways individuals relate to their community because it is often 
taken for granted that this is a naturally occurring process. This thesis aims to answer the 
question of how underlying contradictions contributed to the formation of a modern nation-state. 
Additionally, some scholars previously suggested that there are good or bad ways to modernize a 
nation, and used Japan and Germany as examples of “bad” given their fall into Fascism. 
Historian Erik Grimmer-Solem summarized the trend of  historiography to use Germany and 
                                               
1  Before the rise of the Meiji state, Commodore Perry of the United States negotiated the first of the Unequal 
Treaties with Japan in 1854, several European nations following soon after. Historian Michael R. Auslin 
summarized the treaties as,  “...contained provisions for extraterritoriality, denied the Japanese the freedom to set 
their own tariff rates, and they included most-favored nation (MFN) status for the Western signatories but not the 
Japanese.”  The Unequal Treaties put Japan at a distinct economic disadvantage in increasingly global trade 
relations. Such an economic disadvantage posed the risk of further vulnerability to Western Imperialism, and the 
potential for destabilization within Japan. If the Meiji state hoped to protect Japan from further encroachment of 
Western nation-states it would need to achieve a level of modernization that Western-nation states would be forced 
to recognize as a worthy of renegotiating treaties on more equal terms.  
 
Please see Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese 
Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2-71   
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Japan as examples of modernization that broke from the liberal-democratic path, “A number of 
these German influences would justify authoritarian, statist, semi-feudal, and nativist tendencies 
in Meiji Japan, thereby reinforcing Japanese peculiarity and deviance from liberal-democratic 
patterns of development.”2 This project resists the tendency to split the making of a modern 
nation-state into oversimplified categories of “good” or “bad.” This thesis does not read from 
World War II backward, or accept Japan’s progress through the Meiji period and beyond as an 
inevitability. Those previous methods rob the history of the dynamic intersections and dialogues 
that shaped the way people experienced their relationship to “nation.” Instead, this project 
addresses the dialogues surrounding how the concepts of authority, individualism, and nation 
functioned in Meiji era Japan. To accomplish this, I tracked the relationships between different 
people, ideas, and the authority of the community through politics, intellectual debate, and 
literature. I combined these elements to demonstrate that not only are each of these areas 
connected, they were always a part of each other. None of them could have occurred the way 
they did without the influence of the others because they existed within the same space and 
thought. To make that clear, I will peel back the layers of creating a national identity.3 
Prior to the Meiji State, the Tokugawa Bakufu controlled Japan for around 260 years. The 
Tokugawa Bakufu was a military government, based on the hereditary samurai class, led by the 
Shogun. The Tokugawa Bakufu maintained a closed country policy severely restricting contact 
with outside nations. It worked off the Bakuhan system where feudal lords resided over semi-
autonomous domains called hans.  In this system, the identity of the public defined the 
                                               
2 Erik Grimmer-Solem, "German Social Science, Meiji Conservatism, and the Peculiarities of Japanese History."  
Journal of World History 16, no. 2 (2005): 189. 
3 This project breaks with a vein of historiography that emerged in the 1970s, tying Germany and Japan together to 
explain how the breaking from a standard path of modernization rooted in liberal-democratic tendencies led to 
fascist regimes. This project weaves together themes and ideas addressed in works such as Japan’s Modern Myths 
by Carol Gluck, Dawn to the West by Donald Keene, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature by Karatani Kōjin, and 
Making a Moral Society by Richard M. Reitan.    
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individual’s subjectivity around one's relationship to their specific community (often han), and 
the relationship of that community to the Bakufu. After abolishing the Bakuhan system, the Meiji 
State sought to replace it with a new national identity by redefining systems of power, the public, 
and the agency of the individual within the nation. Part of that redefining process included 
gathering information from around the world. Integrating ideology from abroad promised a path 
to create the foundation of the nation-state that Meiji leaders desired, but that same importation 
chafed against the past that the Meiji state tried (and never completely succeeded) to separate 
itself from. State leaders had to wrestle the unifying control they desired away from the rubble of 
the Tokugawa Bakufu, and weave it into the very nature of the public that the nation required. 
I. Writing a Public Fit for the Nation 
First, the Meiji state had to set the legal precedent for its authority to exercise that 
unifying power. The Charter Oath of 1868 was the first attempt to create that legal foundation. 
This document served as Meiji leaders’ attempt to solidify power after troops from the Satsuma 
and Chōshū domains overtook the Imperial Palace and declared an “imperial restoration” in 
defeating the reign of the military government of the Tokugawa Bakufu.4  The term “imperial 
restoration” claimed that the defeat of Tokugawa forces restored the emperor to his proper 
position as the heart of the state. The heart of the Meiji state still required a body though, a 
public body. To create that public, state leaders needed to incorporate the people into the new 
state, and encourage their involvement in its success. The Charter Oath states:  
By this oath, we set up as our aim the establishment of the national weal on a 
broad basis and the framing of a constitution and laws.  
                                               
4 “Letter of Resignation of the Last Shogun.” in Sources of  Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000. 2nd ed. Vol. 2,  
comps. William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001), 670. 
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1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters 
decided by public discussion.  
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the 
administration of affairs of state.  
3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials 
shall each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may 
be no discontent.  
4. Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based 
upon the just laws of Nature. 
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to 
strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. 
[Meiji boshin, pp. 81-81; McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, p.8]5  
While public involvement in the state appealed to shades of democracy, incorporating the public 
into the state structure provided a function other than representation. By outlining the role that 
the public should play in assemblies, administration, and pursuing a “calling,” the state 
effectively claimed the public as a part of the legal body of the state. In subsuming the public, the 
writers of the Charter Oath not only tried to consolidate their public, but also set the foundation 
for monopolizing violence by establishing the state as the centralizing authority of these 
assemblies and affairs. State leaders tried to sever the past systems of the Tokugawa Bakufu 
from the present by associating previous practices with “evil,” and not being based on the “just 
laws of nature.” State leaders did violence to public memory to attempt to separate the people 
from their prior identities and push them towards a new national identity. The Meiji state-makers 
                                               
5 “The Charter Oath,” in Sources of  Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000. 2nd ed. Vol. 2,  comps. William Theodore de 
Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 672.  
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defamiliarized the structure of the Tokugawa Bakufu as something inherently negative; both the 
individuals and the state had to avoid those past policies for the good of the nation and the 
public.  
The writers of the Charter Oath drew a clear line in the sand. That line outlined the public 
and helped distance Meiji leaders from their own ironic participation in the various cliques of the 
Tokugawa’s Bakuhan system.6 The Charter Oath worked to manufacture a safe distance from the 
recent past to reduce the strength of that history’s influence on the present moment. The Meiji 
state promised a nation where people of all classes would enjoy equality and participation in 
government affairs. The Meiji state-leaders also encouraged the association of the new state with 
the “knowledge” that they intended to carefully curate from around the world for the betterment 
of Japan. Words like “just” and “nature” implied that the Meiji state replaced a system of unjust 
and unnatural practices. On the other side of the line, the Charter Oath alluded to the 
consequences of slipping back into the practices of Tokugawa Bakufu. The document offered no 
specific threat, but by contrasting all the positive benefits of the Meiji state with the “evil” of the 
past, state-leaders planted the seed of a threat. The Meiji state’s community excluded those who 
engaged in those condemned practices. The Charter Oath’s underlying threat of inclusion versus 
exclusion from the community of nation shored up the state’s solidification of its right to 
monopolize violence. State-leaders branded that violence as an engine for the type of progress 
the nation needed to defend itself from Western Imperialism and the internal fracturing that 
contributed to the fall of the Tokugawa Bakufu. 
Three years after the Charter Oath, the Meiji state made good on its promise to gather 
information from around the world to strengthen the nation. To kick start that project the Meiji 
                                               
6  E.H. Norman, Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman, edited by John W. 
Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 162-4. 
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state sent many of its leaders, including Iwakura Tomomi, Okubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, 
Itō Hirobumi, and Kume Kunitake, abroad to the United States and Europe on the Iwakura 
Mission in 1872-3. The mission had several goals. One, to gather information on state-building 
tactics, military structure, and educational institutions. Two, spread recognition of the Meiji State 
and the “restored” Meiji emperor. Three, renegotiate the economically unfair treaties imposed by 
the United States and several European nations.7 The information acquired on this mission 
served as a foundation for the Meiji state’s policy-making, including educational and 
constitutional models. The mission provided another knife for the Meiji State to use to try to cut 
itself free from the past. First, state delegates needed to sharpen that blade using the various stops 
the mission made.  
 Germany was one of the key stops that Kume identified in his reports. Germany’s 
emergence as a player for major power unsettled many of its European neighbors but made it a 
promising source of information on industrializing quickly. The Iwakura Mission visited not 
only governmental institutions in Germany, but also a military museum, an armory, and 
factories.8 The mission made similar stops in other nations. Studying military, legal procedures, 
and economic systems provided references for the processes that create the growth outlined in 
the Charter Oath. Namely, the growth Japan needed to gain the wealth and stability need to 
maintain itself against imperialism. The mission served another function: clarifying the position 
of individuals and community. 
The treatment the members of the Iwakura mission received while in Germany served as 
an example of diplomacy that helped define how people relate to one another when they are a 
                                               
7 Ian Nish ed, The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment. (Abingdon: Japan Library, 1998): 
2-4. 
8 Ibid, 119. 
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part of different communities (nations). The delegates on the Iwakura Mission were not the only 
Japanese studying in Germany. Kume reported, “...that the Japanese students were able to appear 
at the railway station in large numbers, because the teachers had given them leave. And the 
teachers did so, because they revered their Emperor and wished to act in the same way as him, 
greeting the Japanese mission.”9 This gathering of school students showed a specific Japanese 
subjectivity coming to light, or at least the appearance of one. The students were not just any 
students that came to see the Iwakura Mission, they were Japanese students. The implication is 
that there was a sense of identification between students and the delegates the Iwakura Mission; 
that they were all Japanese people in Germany. The students meeting other Japanese while 
abroad reinforced their identification with a sense of “Japaneseness.”   They encountered men 
who were a part of the same community as them, which demonstrated how individuals learn how 
to relate to their community through others within it. Furthermore, the German people acted in 
reference to Emperor Wilhelm I in their treatment of the delegates of the Iwakura Mission. The 
German people identified the Japanese delegates as an “other” within Germany, thus 
contributing both to what it meant to be German and to what it meant to be Japanese. The 
Iwakura delegates brought home the political and legal ideologies they sought out, and a 
sharpened sense of national identity.  
The findings of the Iwakura Mission and the Meiji States’ current policy did not, 
however, provide an entirely satisfactory answer to the question of how to define the public’s 
relation to the state. The Charter Oath provided a legal definition of that relationship, but 
intellectuals debated the principles underlying the legal construction. The people that made up 
the public had to be theoretically defined for the project started by the Charter Oath to work. The 
                                               
9 Ibid, 115 
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Meiji Six Society, a group intellectuals interested in promoting Western learning, took on this 
debate in their 1874-5 journal the Meirokuzasshi, or Meiji Six Journal. The Meiji Six Society 
wrote about a range of topics, but much of their work focused on concerns over the state of the 
Meiji Government. They debated different methods of bringing the people and the government 
into unity with each other. This unity was necessary to both progress and security, although what 
precisely those things looked like differed. Historian Carol Gluck writes, “Although the 
definitions both of the task and of the threat were vastly different depending on the group 
elaborating them, the collective call was to the people, who lacked, it was said, an adequately 
developed, ‘sense of nation.’”10 The Meiji Six Society recognized the state’s desire to 
consolidate its power and stability by teaching the people to have a greater “sense of nation.” 
That “sense of nation,” could only be taught through interacting with the state’s community of 
“nation.” The Meiji Six Society disagreed on the nature of individuals as a part of the state. 
For one, Meiji Six members expressed different views on the line between the people and 
the state. Fukuzawa Yukichi argued for the establishing the power of the people as a force 
standing “side by side” with the government.11 Fukuzawa saw the people and the government as 
separate; two entities standing beside each other. Mori Arinori criticized Fukuzawa’s “side by 
side” argument stating that, “Should you ask who the people are, the term signifies persons who 
possess rights associated with obligations that involve responsibilities. Officials, aristocrats, and 
commoners, therefore, are all included in the people.”12  While Fukuzawa drew a line between 
the government and those outside it, Mori did not. Mori claimed that every person on the land 
                                               
10 Carol Gluck,  Japan's Modern Myths. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 23. 
11 Mori Arinori, “Criticism of the Essay on the Role of Scholars.” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the  
Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi  
and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 23 
12 Ibid.  
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registers of Japan had their obligations as a Japanese national regardless of their specific position 
within the country.13 This difference in Fukuzawa and Mori’s views showed the struggle of 
defining the relationship between the public and the state. Do the government and the people 
influence each other from different sides of a division? Does that influence instead come from 
within an overarching community of “Japan?” These questions remained beneath the debate over 
how to define the public. That definition impacted how influence and power flowed. Meiji Six 
scholars addressed how education and participation in government impacted unity and authority 
as a potential answer. 
 Two opposing viewpoints emerged from that debate: memorialists and gradualists. The 
memorialists advocated for public assembly as a means of bringing the people to enlightenment, 
while the gradualists argued the nature of the people had to be “enlightened” before they should 
have the power to fully participate in government.14 These views stood on different sides of the 
thin line between the freedom of the individual and the authority of the state. The tension 
between how intellectuals defined this relationship questioned several factors: the direction 
power flows, the legitimacy of the ideologies the state based its authority on, and the agency of 
the public. For example, gradualist Katō Hiroyuki wrote, “Yet the state’s power must ultimately 
be undermined if there is a great excess of ‘liberalism.’ A nation can never survive once the state 
power has been undermined.”15 Katō tended to favor Austro-German models of the relationship 
between state and people. Gradualists like Katō feared that too much freedom for individuals 
would weaken the state’s power and render it ineffectual. If that were to happen, the community 
                                               
13 Ibid.. 
14 William Reynolds Braisted. “Introduction,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William 
Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976): xvii-xlviii 
15 Katō Hiroyuki, “In Response to Fukuzawa,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William 
Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 22.   
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of nation itself would crumble without the authority of the state to hold it together. To avoid this 
disintegration, the state had to educate the people to think of themselves as a part of Japan’s 
public as their primary identity. The state had to install the specific rules and values of the 
relationship between individual and community, between public and nation.  Without this 
education, the state ran a heightened risk of the people using their participation to undermine the 
very community they were a part of. 
On the opposing side, memorialists maintained that the people had to learn through 
participation. From this view, the freedom of individuals strengthened the unity of the nation. 
Memorialist Tsuda Mamichi advocated for freedom of the press using language complimentary 
to the practices of Britain and America. He wrote, “Civilized peoples escape from the reins with 
which barbarian governments oppress men. The distinction between civilization and barbarian 
can only be viewed in terms of whether the people have or have not freedom of speech and 
conduct.”16 The words “civilization” and “barbarian” are highly politicized terms. They denote a 
hierarchy of power both within and outside of the society in question. A “barbarian” government 
oppresses its people while a “civilized” one allows for “freedom of speech and conduct.” In the 
“barbarous” situation the state consumes the rights of the people down to nothingness while 
undermining its own legitimacy among other nations.  
A “barbarous” nation could never stand on the same playing field as civilized nations 
according to the rationale behind Western Imperialism and the Unequal Treaties.17 The 
relationship between “barbarian” versus “civilized” was one that granted the “civilized” the 
authority to exert power over the “barbarian.” Taking this into consideration, Tsuda believed that 
                                               
16 Mamichi Tsuda, “Criticism of the Essay on the Role of Scholars,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the  
Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi  
and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 72-73.  
17 Please see footnote 1 on page 1 for more information on the Unequal Treaties. 
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the individual’s rights to participation and expression cultivated the learning the people needed 
to have to uphold a modern nation-state. Opposite of Katō’s stance, memorialists argued that not 
using participation as the method of education would undermine the legitimacy and stability of 
the state. Tsuda added that Americans and Englishmen are truly free because their freedom of 
speech and conduct prevents them from depriving others of these freedoms because they attach 
so much value to their own rights to said freedoms.18 Memorialists like Tsuda took the position 
that if individuals have more agency within the community, they are more likely to want to 
uphold those rights for others, as well as the stability of the authority that grants and projects 
those freedoms.   
What did this disagreement between intellectuals mean for the legal parameters and goals 
of the Charter Oath? Line four of the Charter Oath claimed that the Meiji State based policies on 
the “just laws of Nature.” The reference to “laws of Nature” was the same type of language and 
reasoning that appeared in the Constitutions of many Western nation-states. There is something 
unnatural about this version of “nature” despite the implication that these “laws” are an 
organically occurring way to organize a nation-state.  The disagreement among the Meiji Six 
scholars highlighted the contradiction embedded in this concept that so many nation-states laid 
claim to as a source of legitimizing authority. There is a contradiction in the true laws of nature 
because the “truth” those laws depend on is something that an external force must create in the 
people rather than something occurring in nature. The memorialists and gradualists of the Meiji 
Six Society provided different solutions to the question of how to define the public in relation to 
the state. However, both of their solutions involved developing the public in terms of national 
                                               
18 Mamichi Tsuda, “Criticism of the Essay on the Role of Scholars,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the  
Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi  
and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 72-73.  
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spirit, unity, and education. Is “nature” still natural if it is something that must be taught, rather 
than something intrinsic to the people?  Furthermore, different versions of what various parts of 
the public considered “just” or “natural” boiled underneath Meiji state’s attempts to create a 
unified national identity. The state provided an initial language of “nation,” but in handing that 
language to the public, the people could take it and transform or reinterpret it.  
II. Resistance and the Dialogue of Disagreement 
In 1877, the Meiji state experienced a challenge to its attempts to define the relation 
between individuals and the state. That challenge was the Satsuma Rebellion. While Meiji state-
makers worked on how to progress away from the Tokugawa Bakufu, that progression 
threatened to leave certain groups behind. The fall of the Tokugawa Bakufu marked the end of 
the samurai class as the oligarchs of the nation. Those samurai did not disappear despite Meiji 
state leader attempting to break with the past. 20,000 former samurai led by Saigō Takamori 
revolted against the Meiji State. Saigō had previously assisted in the creation of the Meiji state, 
but fractures occurred when Saigō became estranged from the agendas of Meiji state leaders.19 
While Meiji state-leaders were abroad, Saigō advocated for an invasion of Korea to demonstrate 
Japan’s military strength and the value of the samurai class as protectors of Japan’s polity.20  
State leaders opposed the plan to invade Korea, denying Saigō and his followers the 
opportunity to prove the place of the samurai class in Meiji Japan.21 The former samurai fell into 
the gap between the ghost of the Tokugawa Bakufu, and the Meiji State’s attempts to shape the 
relationship of the people to “nation.” When there appears to be no place left for any given 
group, they meet the mortality of their specific way of life. That pressure builds until three 
                                               
19 Charles L. Yates. "Saigō Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan." Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 3 (1994): 449 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 
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possible outcomes remain; assimilate to the new conditions, carve out a space to exist, or 
ultimately disappear. Saigō Takamori and his followers attempted option two. Attacking the 
Meiji state offered the opportunity to potentially destroy the forces that appeared to be choking 
the samurai class. The Meiji state’s prescription of “laws of nature” felt unnatural to Saigō and 
his followers. Thus, they resisted the attempts of the state to dictate a version of Japan, and what 
it meant to be Japanese, that failed to represent how they related to their community. The 
Satsuma Rebellion sought to redefine that relationship or break it off trying.  
The Satsuma Rebellion failed with Saigō and many of his followers dead by the end of it. 
The rebellion’s failure succeeded in capturing a specific moment in defining the Meiji state’s 
version of identity and nation. While the Meiji state counted it as a victory for the Enlightenment 
ideals of reason and progress over the backwardness of feudalism, others had a different view. 
With Saigō, a sense of possibility that had characterized Meiji politics seemed to die too.22  Saigō 
embodied a collective of dissenting voices from high and low. Historian Mark J. Ravina wrote, 
“Saigō represented an alternative to a statist, bureaucratic, and centralizing vision of modern 
Japan. An implausible range of critics, from proponents of Rousseau’s social contract to 
defenders of samurai tradition, identified with Saigō s rebellion and mourned his death as a 
triumph of autocracy.”23 It was ironic that the Meiji state claimed to value public assembly and 
discussion, yet sections of its public saw the steps state-makers took to create a sense of “nation” 
as the marks of autocracy. That tension turned Saigō Takamori’s defeat into a symbol greater 
than the death of one man. His death became the triumph of the Meiji state and a serious blow to 
                                               
22 Mark J. Ravina. "The Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō Takamori: Samurai, "Seppuku", and the Politics of Legend." 
The Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 3 (2010), 692.  
23  Ibid 
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the chorus of dissenting voices.24 The resistance of the Satsuma Rebellion demonstrated that 
state methods of encouraging a particular relationship between individuals and the community of 
nation ran the risk of alienating the very people the state needed to serve as its public.25 
 When a source of authority creates a model identity as a tool for maintaining 
sovereignty, it opens the door for attempts to break that mold. By outlining the roles of Japanese 
people in the Meiji state, the Meiji state gave the public a tangible target to wrestle with. For 
example, proponents of Rousseau's philosophy took Western ideology and turned it back on the 
Meiji state, while defenders of the samurai tradition leveled Japan’s past as a weapon. The 
Satsuma Rebellion challenged the Meiji state’s ability to hold onto the power it had consolidated 
after the end of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Specifically, a group of the individuals that state leaders 
tried to incorporate into their public, broke away from both the legal and theoretical definitions 
that worked to bind individuals and community.  
The writers of the Charter Oath had tried to separate the people and national memory 
from the Tokugawa Bakufu by charging it with participating in “evil customs of the past.” The 
consequences of community versus exclusion underlying that language were not enough to sway 
the participants of the Satsuma Rebellion. Conversely, the repeated attempts to push the people 
towards a new national identity backfired by driving a wedge between the state and those who 
still tied a large part of their identity to the remains of the Tokugawa Bakufu. That split in the 
                                               
24  Saigō Takamori was said to have committed suicide despite medical reports suggesting otherwise. The legacy of 
his suicide remained largely unchallenged in the historiography of the period despite there being a lack of concrete 
evidence. Other stories included that Saigo potentially ascended to Mars or escaped to Russia. The fantastical nature 
of these legacies marked not the precise truth of Saigo’s death, but the significance of it in regards to the death of the 
samurai class, and the significance of that death to the future of Japan. Please see  Mark J. Ravina’s "The 
Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō Takamori: Samurai, "Seppuku", and the Politics of Legend” in The Journal of Asian 
Studies 69, no. 3.  
25 It is important to note that grievances against the Meiji State came from a variety of groups. For example, 
disaffected samurai groups, commoners who were unhappy with the new land tax and local levies design, and those 
pushing for a more representative government. Please see Mark J. Ravina. "The Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō 
Takamori: Samurai, "Seppuku", and the Politics of Legend." 711-3.  
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relationship between individual and state demonstrated another contradiction embedded in the 
making of a modern nation-state. The state needed to create a public for the nation but the same 
processes intended to create a collectivity in that public ran the risk of breeding disunity. That 
disunity then called on another step in the state-building process: the monopolization of violence.  
The Meiji State’s imperial army suppressed the Satsuma Rebellion with violence after a 
five-month struggle.26 This type of armed violence was an extension of the rhetorical violence 
alluded to in political policies. Rebellion provided a tangible example of why state leaders staked 
a claim in ensuring that the agency of individuals only went so far. The imperial army defeated 
the alternative versions of national identity that Saigō and his men represented, and by extension, 
the Meiji state furthered its control over both violence and identity. The imperial army overtook 
the violence of the Satsuma Rebellion, thus forwarding the ideology that the state was the key 
negotiator in regards to national identity. The public did not have the right to exert that same 
pressure. By successfully putting down the Satsuma Rebellion, the Meiji state once again 
showed its commitment to separating the people from their former or alternative versions of 
national identity, even if gaining that control over Japanese subjectivity required the deaths of 
those seen as disrupting the goal of unity. With the Charter Oath’s intentions and resistance to 
the Meiji state both on the table, state leaders needed to create another bridge between the 
community of nation and the individuals within it.  
Twelve years after the Satsuma Rebellion, the Meiji State promulgated its Constitution in 
1889. A constitution serves as a contract between the nation and its people. Additionally, writing 
a constitution was one of the processes Meiji State leaders had considered while traveling 
abroad. State leaders intended for the Constitution to tie together ideologies from abroad with the 
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specific needs of Japan to address the tensions that still needed ironing out. One cannot overlook 
that writing a constitution is inherently about control. It depends on the success of legally 
defining a public in a manner that causes that public to self-identify with the state-prescribed 
identity. Statesman Itō Hirobumi served as the central figure in developing the constitution.27 He 
claimed, “I, for one, am convinced that now is the time to make unprecedented reforms and that 
conditions are already ripe for them… In politics it is best to adopt methods that fit changing 
circumstance.”28  The Meiji state had already issued the Charter Oath in 1868 which defined the 
goals and values of the state. Then the state experienced resistance to its ideals during the 
Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. By 1889, state leaders needed to double down on their goal of 
weaving the public and their idea of “nation” together.  
The writing process highlighted the same conflict that appeared in the Meiji Six Journals. 
All writers agreed that the imperial institution should remain intact and that an assembly was 
necessary. Gradualists favored a more limited legislature (similar to Germany), with the main 
focus on a system for developing Japan’s “national essence.”29 After experiencing resistance, 
state leaders raised the stakes on what it meant to be a citizen of Japan. Historian Carol Gluck 
referenced Taiyo 3, no. 20 arguing, “that ‘just being born and raised in this country is not enough 
for the masses to be considered citizens (kokumin). The prerequisite for citizenship is a sound 
sense of nation (kokkateki kannen),’ without which the people remain ‘unpatriots’ (hikokumin), 
and the nation endangered.”30 Different sides of the Constitutional debate fought over what type 
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of governmental structure would work best to instill that national essence in the people. The 
popular rights side (in line with the Meiji Six’s memorialists) wanted to introduce a British-style 
democracy with a two-chambered assembly and cabinet.31 Furthermore, the debate that went into 
deciding on the details of the Constitution meant that a vital piece of creating a modern nation-
state came from the act of arguing over what precisely constituted the national essence the Meiji 
state wanted. The debates of the Meiji Six Society and writers of the Constitution, combined 
with dissenting voices of the Satsuma Rebellion, demonstrated the vastness of the experiences 
that existed behind the veil of a single unified public. The Constitution of 1889 served as one 
document intended to bridge (and control) the multiplicity of identities that grated against 
attempts to create one definition of the relationship between the public and their national 
community. 
The very first lines of the Constitution of 1889 laid out the legitimacy of state authority, 
and the intention to influence and develop the people for the collective benefit of the nation. The 
preamble states, “Having by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a 
lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give 
development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects.... and hoping to 
maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support.”32  
Similar to the Charter Oath, writers emphasized unity between the public and the state. This 
pattern was not specific to just Japan. For example, the Constitution of the German Empire 1871 
stated: “For the whole of Germany one common nationality exists with the effect that every 
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person (subject, State citizen) belonging to any one of the federated States…”33 Given the 
Iwakura Mission’s visit to Germany (and other Western nations) the Meiji Constitution writers’ 
use of a similar type of collective language showed a pattern. The Iwakura Mission member’s 
goal of collecting information on state-building tactics highlighted that Japan was not the only 
nation that needed to walk the line between a modern nation-state’s monopoly on violence and 
the rights of individuals. One of the most tried methods for convincing individuals to identify 
with the needs and desires of their community is to appeal to the benefits of being a part of “us” 
instead of “them.”  
Furthermore, the Meiji Constitution stated the state’s goal of developing the moral and 
intellectual faculties of the subjects to achieve that unity. The writers’ appeal to a collective 
effort towards the benefit of the state not only asked for unity, but it implied the consequences of 
standing out of that unity. If one was not a part of the community that worked towards the 
betterment of the nation, then they were an obstacle to that goal. Such obstacles, namely 
alternative versions of national identity, posed a risk to the collectivist mentally that the Meiji 
state wished to install as a vital part of belonging to the nation. The Satsuma Rebellion twelve 
years prior provided a still memorable example of what happens when a group of subjects 
becomes too forceful with an alternative version of what it meant to be a Japanese subject. The 
connection between the Meiji state’s goals, dissenting voices, and the desire to bridge that gap, 
grappled with contradictions embedded in the process of state-making. While those 
contradictions also appear in intellectual debate and literature, they come up even within the 
Meiji State’s policy.  
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A key contradiction was the balancing act between the state’s authority and its role in 
guaranteeing individual freedoms. The Constitution stated that, within the limit of the law, 
Japanese subjects have the rights to freedom of speech and writing, association, publication, and 
public meetings.34 The inclusion of “within the limit of the law” gave State leaders an out if the 
liberties given to the public became too unruly. Yet at the same time, the promise of those 
freedoms served to reinforce the goal of unity. It allowed subjects to feel as though the 
community helped project their voices. State leaders offered subjects the choice to use writing, 
speech, debate, etc. to navigate how they related to other individuals and the community of 
nation. The state’s power, as codified in the Constitution, hinged on its control of violence. 
Simultaneously, however, the state rooted its legitimacy in these new claims about the condition 
and freedoms of the individual. There is a paradoxical relationship between desiring a united 
identity and opening an avenue for a plurality of different dialogues about that relation. The 
individual had to have the ability to freely navigate his/her relation to the community, but the 
state leaders could not allow the discussion surrounding that navigation to splinter the ideals the 
Meiji state set out.  
III. Education and the Relationship between Knowledge and Morals 
One way that Meiji state leaders attempted balance that tension was precisely as the 
preamble of the Constitution stated: developing the moral and intellectual faculties of the public. 
A vital method to drive that development was education.35 Education created a means of 
disseminating the state’s code of civil morality to the people. State leaders intended for the 
popularization of this education to help shift the intellectual and moral foundations of the people 
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into something easily utilized for state benefit. Previously in 1872, writers of  the Preamble to the 
Fundamental Code of Education repeated the practice of separating the public from the past by 
referring to the traditions and policies of the Tokugawa era as something, “...that impeded the 
spread of culture, hampered the development of talent and accomplishments, and sowed the 
seeds of poverty, bankruptcy, and disrupted homes.”36 State leaders took very tangible 
consequences (poverty, bankruptcy, etc) and offered education as a means of avoiding said 
consequences. Still, that measure was not enough to gain unity and control of the public, as seen 
by the Meiji Six Society’s debates and the Satsuma Rebellion. The 1872 Education Code used a 
combination of consequences and tying all aspects of human activity (everything from military 
affairs to daily communication) to education. By 1890, state leaders took a different approach 
that focused directly on combining intellectual and moral faculties into a civil morality.  
Meiji state leaders promulgated the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. Gluck 
describes the origins of the document as, “The origin of the Rescript, or more properly, of the 
civil morality it epitomized, was the premise that national education should serve the state.”37 
The Meiji state’s overtures towards creating a specific national identity required the success of 
popularizing “civil morality” through the educational system. The opening of the Rescript on 
Education encouraged subjects to: 
 ... pursue learning and cultivate the arts and thereby develop 
intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public 
good and promote common interests; always respect the constitution and 
observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourself to the state (giyu ko 
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ni hoshi); and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our imperial throne 
coeval with heaven and earth.38 
State leaders presented the development of moral and intellectual faculties as something intended 
to serve the good of the public and the individuals that made up that public. The wording of the 
appeal encouraged individuals to think of themselves as sharing common interests with other 
members of the community. The Imperial Rescript on Education suggested that sharing common 
interests benefitted the everyone, thus implying that interests not part of that commonality were 
detrimental to the well-being of individuals and state alike. The language of “common” 
forwarded the collectivism of a national identity that state leaders desired. Additionally, the 
Imperial Rescript on Education demanded adherence to the constitution and all laws, as well as 
giving up oneself in service of the state (should it be necessary).  
Civil morality depended on individuals identifying themselves with the community of 
nation to the point of sacrificing parts of one’s agency. Philosopher Ōnishi Hajime (1864-1900) 
identified a conflict between the demands of civil morality in the Rescript and the individual 
freedoms promised in other legal documents. Historian Richard M. Reitan summarized Ōnishi’s 
argument that, “...if proper moral action lies solely in obedience to a command, without that 
command to obey or disobey, there can be no morality… and if the state succeeded in making 
the entire population ‘moral,’ then none could be both moral and free…”39 This was one more 
example of the challenge of negotiating freedom and authority. If the state’s singularity of 
morals succeeded, then the state undermined its own claims of individual freedoms. The state 
tried to teach “morality” as obedience, but that definition failed to capture the various other 
                                               
38 “The Opening,”  in Sources of  Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000. 2nd ed. Vol. 2,  comps. William Theodore de 
Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 780. 
39 Richard M. Reitan, Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan. (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2010): 96. 
22 
 
forces that impact one’s sense of “morality.”  
Education and morality continued to raise concerns as even those in favor of the Western-
style learning the Meiji state favored had doubts over its consequences. Historian Thomas Haven 
writes, “One of the pressing questions facing the Western-oriented educator in restoration Japan 
was that of personal morality.”40  Recalling the Constitution’s claim of developing intellectual 
and moral faculties, the challenge at hand becomes apparent. The meeting of intellectualism and 
morality itself posed a problem. Developing the intellectual faculties of the individual risked 
granting the public the tools to criticize the moral faculties that the state wanted to instill. The 
state provided a legal language of “nation” and the morals that should accompany membership in 
that nation, however, the public still had the power to turn that language against itself. Why was 
it so difficult to impact different sides of individuals at once?  
For one, intellectuals disagreed on the nature of the individual as part of the state. A brief 
return to the Meiji Six Society reveals that first challenge. Specifically, the Meiji Six Society’s 
argument identified the issue with influencing intellectual faculties; that if “truth” as in the “laws 
of Nature” does not function universally then the transfer of knowledge runs the risk of 
undermining the authority that implements it. Those intellectual faculties were not the only 
concern though. Another key piece was how intellectual development influenced morality. The 
relationship between those different parts of the individual related to the relationship between the 
agency of the individual and the authority of the state because of the role both knowledge and 
morality played in trying to create unity.  
In his early 1900s essays, intellectual and author Takayama Chogyū analyzed exactly 
why attempts to influence the nature of the people were so difficult. While Chogyū did not write 
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directly in response to the Satsuma Rebellion or the Constitution of 1889, the fact that he wrote 
about these tensions after both of these events is significant. It indicated that the tensions that 
had sparked the Satsuma Rebellion had not disappeared, nor had the Constitution of 1889 or 
Imperial Rescript on Education successfully created adherence to a singular national identity.41 
Chogyū problematized two cornerstones of state authority: “truth,” and the relationship between 
intellectual and moral development.  To explore those issues, Chogyū split consciousness into 
three sections.  
First, consciousness of truth, which stated that mutual exchange creates knowledge 
through the consensus of different subjects, thus creating an objective standard. Importantly, the 
concept “truth” is something that people must produce, rather than a self-evident reality. 
Additionally, forces outside of the individual (such as the state) can influence the knowledge of 
individuals by encouraging mutual acknowledgment of a proposed “truth,” be this truth that of 
nation, citizen, etc. Once the community establishes what constitutes knowledge, that knowledge 
serves as the standard by which individuals judge other ideas and information.42 Next in 
Chogyū’s theory is aesthetic pleasure, which is based on feelings/taste, making it absolute for the 
individual experiencing it, and tying it intimately to self-consciousness.43 That individuality of 
experience highlights an awareness of the self rather than a focus on a mutual standard. Aesthetic 
pleasure comes from the single subject’s awareness of its own feelings, while knowledge comes 
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from the way one subject’s perception of what is true overlaps with others subjects to affirm that 
knowledge.44 There is another overlap though, “moral consciousness.” 
Morality functions through a mutually constructed understanding of what good or bad is, 
and the consequences of it. It serves as an objective standard through which people judge 
themselves and others. Morality also requires self-awareness, the same kind of absolute reality of 
that self-consciousness seen in the tastes of aesthetic pleasures. Chogyū demonstrated that an 
external force like the law cannot change the highly subjectivity personal tastes of individuals, 
which makes up part of their moral consciousness. The problem of influencing subjective taste, 
combined with the fact that the state’s attempts to create a single version of “knowledge” stood 
on a foundation of disagreement rather than a unified consensus, demonstrated that influence 
comes from multiple competing sources. Thus, the state could not gain full control over the 
moral faculties of its public. The Imperial Rescript on Education offered the state as one 
purveyor of morality, but Chogyū showed that morality is much slipperier than just a command 
or common interests. Morality depends on the individual’s own tastes/feelings as much as it 
depends on a shared base of knowledge with community members. Chogyū summarized,  
While at the same time feeling the absoluteness of its own 
consciousness when facing its innerside, moral consciousness recognizes the 
objective standards to be obeyed when looking from the outside…. moral 
consciousness includes two principles - subjectivity and objectivity - that are 
opposite principles. To worry about, to feel reverence for, and to cooperate 
toward the unification and harmonization of both, this is the moral activity of 
humanity.45  
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Morality itself consists of oppositional forces, therefore, the state’s attempts to influence the 
morality of the public had to contend with that friction. Between the conflict within the concept 
of morality, and the conflict between “nation” and individual, any identity stemming from these 
conversations contained those layers of opposition. The desire to create a national identity relied 
on trying to harmonize opposites, just like objectivity and subjectivity in Chogyū’s theory. The 
result was that neither intellectual nor moral development contained one true path like state 
rhetoric suggested. Rather, both of these elements fundamentally depended on oppositional 
forces.  
Through the tensions between the State’s attempts to define the people and the 
intellectual responses to that definition, one can see the rejection of modern “truth” as something 
self-sufficient. People create truth, which means that no one truth is universally applicable. 
Instead of a single modern “truth,” different intentions and interpretations defined themselves 
both in reference to and in resistance of each other. Chogyū’s work echoed an intellectual trend 
of questioning the foundations of truth and morality. Famously, Friedrick Nietzsche struck at 
truth as man-made metaphor used to generalize differences.46 Nietzsche also argued that a sense 
of morality occurred through socialization to it, with people collectively judging themselves and 
others.47 This intellectual trend emerged precisely because truth and morality served as 
mediators of the relationship between state and individuals in Japan and abroad. These tensions 
demonstrated that opposition underlined every faculty the Meiji state attempted to utilize for a 
national essence. Any sense of national identity that did emerged came from the conversation 
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between opposing forces (knowledge, taste, morality, etc), not one force subsuming the others. 
IV. The Literary Mirror 
Popular novelists of the time like Natsume Sōseki and Mori Ōgai also represented the 
tension between the state’s influence and authority versus the agency of the individual in their 
writings.  Literary production in the Meiji era started off slowly, but it began to build rapidly as 
translations of European works sparked Japanese writers’ interest. Meiji era literature took on the 
unique position of both incorporating elements of Western literary techniques, and “returns” to 
Japanese traditions.48  Literature served as another meeting place for the tensions between state 
and individual, in addition to the friction between Western ideology and Japanese tradition. 
While the Meiji State wanted to create a particular base of knowledge breaking from the 
“backward” past, the high literacy rate (a result of educational policy) also opened the floodgates 
on literature as a vehicle for alternative narratives of the relationship between people and their 
community. The combination of returns to tradition with new literary forms highlighted how the 
literary realm attempted to reconcile the tensions playing out in the social and political spheres. 
Ōgai and Sōseki’s work served as a reflection of how people navigated the forces that 
contributed to their recognition of ideas like “self” and “nation.”  
Natsume Sōseki (1896-1916) focused on themes such as the conflict between the 
collectivism in the mentality of “nation,” versus the agency of the individual. Sōseki studied 
English literature abroad and noticed that famous works, such as those by Shakespeare, did not 
contain the universality that Europeans claimed they did.49 That realization coincided with 
Sōseki’s belief that importing Western ideologies to help shape a unified national identity in 
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Japan created an uneasy relationship with the freedom of individuals to negotiate their own 
relationship between their self and their nation. To summarize, historian Donald Keene wrote, 
“His outlook differed also from that of Japanese of his day who justified their studies of Western 
learning in terms of service to the nation; he insisted that the purpose of education as to ‘develop 
inborn ability and cultivate one’s natural moral nature.’”50  Debates over education highlighted 
education as a tool to benefit the state and the collective identity that state leaders desired. Sōseki 
reframed education and knowledge as a means of promoting the agency of the individual. 
Sōseki’s writing emphasized the contradictions within the methods the Meiji state utilized to 
achieve its goals.  
In his 1905-7 novel, I Am a Cat, Sōseki’s feline narrator mocked Meiji society, namely 
the uneasy balance between Japanese traditions and imported Western ideologies. For example, 
the cat is highly critical of the conceited nature of human knowledge. It says, “And you should 
wish to learn about cats, only a cat can tell you. Humans, however advanced, can tell you 
nothing on this subject. As inasmuch humans are, in fact far less advanced than they fancy 
themselves.”51 Through this barb, Sōseki’s cat indicates the problem with trying to apply any 
given ideology as if it were universal. British, American, or German political structures could not 
precisely fit the experience of the Japanese subject. Just as only a “cat” can teach one all there is 
to know about felines, only the experience of Japanese individuals could reveal the specific 
nature of the relationship between the Meiji state and its public. Sōseki gestured to the fact that 
Meiji state leaders’ attempts to teach the public about themselves (i.e. to influence the nature of 
each individual in terms of knowledge and morality) did not create unity, rather state leaders 
                                               
50 Donald Keene. Dawn to the West: Japanese Literature in the Modern Era. (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 308 
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attempted to smother dissenting voices under the illusion of a singular nation identity.  
In a similar vein Sōseki’s cat says of its master, “Like an ill-natured oyster, he secrets 
himself in his study and has never once opened his mouth to the outside world. And to see him 
there looking as though he alone has truly attained enlightenment, is enough to make a cat 
laugh.”52 In this instance the schoolteacher played the role of the Meiji state, demonstrating the 
illusion that the state alone held the knowledge of how individuals and the state should interact. 
Sōseki’s critique emphasized a point Chogyū made, that knowledge becomes an objective 
standard only through mutual exchange. The State could not claim any truth derived from 
knowledge, if that knowledge did not ever engage with that of the individuals the state presided 
over. Crafting a specific Japanese subjectivity appeared much simpler if one kept alternative 
versions closed off behind discourses like “rebellion,” “ignorance,” and evil traditions.” Even 
though Meiji state makers did attempt to fit and curate Western ideologies for Japan, Sōseki’s 
criticism echoed the criticisms of dissenting voices who charged the Meiji State with autocracy, 
despite its supposed value of ideas of assembly and public discussion. 
Mori Ōgai (1862-1922) struck at the same tension Soseki noticed, but he approached it a 
little differently.  Ōgai received training in Confucianism and martial arts and traveled to 
Germany to continue his studies of medicine.53 The diversity of Ōgai’s experience is reminiscent 
of how Ōgai navigated the relationship between individuals and community in his writing. 
Karatani Kōjin summarized Ōgai’s style as, “In Ōgai’s writing the “self” has no substance, it is 
an ‘assemblage of threads pulled together from different directions,’ precisely what Marx 
prescribed in The German Ideology as ‘a totality of diverse relationships.”54 While I agree with 
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Karatani’s claim that Ōgai created his characters by pulling together a variety of experiences, I 
disagree that the self has “no substance” in Ōgai’s work. The “self” acquires substance from the 
“diverse relationships” pulled together to make that character. That process of acquisition 
reflected the ways individuals shaped their identity in reference to their relationship with the 
authority of the state and their community. All the tensions laid out in the political and 
intellectual documents took up residence within individuals through their interaction with their 
environment. Ōgai’s novels allowed readers to watch the friction between individuals and 
outside relationships play out in a manner that spoke to the underlying contradictions involved in 
making a modern nation-state. 
In 1911, Ōgai began serially publishing The Wild Geese. The novel is set in 1880 and 
contains three important characters. Otama, the mistress of Suezō, who entered the arrangement 
because Suezō agreed to provide for her father. Next is Suezō, an already married money-lender. 
Finally, the main character is Okada, a medical student who first notices Otama when he is 
taking a walk.55 Ōgai’s main character, Okada, is not, however, the greatest interest in the novel. 
Instead, Ōgai built his literary world around the places where different characters and symbols 
intersect. Those points of interaction demonstrated how power, authority, and individuality 
always worked in relation to others.  
For example, at the beginning of The Wild Geese Otama has very little agency. She 
defines her identity through her desire to help her father, and through Suezō’s possession of her. 
She admits it is humiliating to “belong” to a moneylender like Suezō, but more so than that she 
“...had such a sense, it was that of the unfairness of her own destiny. She had done nothing 
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wrong, yet she was to be persecuted by the world.”56   In this line Otama characterizes her 
identity as one lacking agency, however, it is relations with others that impose that 
powerlessness. Otama is not without power on her own, rather she is without power in 
comparison to other forces and subjects. Namely, her societal duty to be filial to her father that 
presses her to enter the engagement with Suezō. The same way Otama feels ensnared by her 
arrangement with Suezō, individuals’ relationship to “nation” places them in a similar kind of 
arrangement. The Meiji state promoted a specific type of identity (and accompanying morality 
and base of knowledge) that became a contract with the public through the codification of power 
presented in the Constitution. The arrangement between the state as the authority of nation and 
the individual, placed the individual in a position of being relatively weak compared to the state. 
The state leaders decided upon the laws, knowledge, and morals that the public should be held 
accountable for. As the public engaged with that dialogue, whether by resistance or adherence, 
they embedded those values within themselves. By interacting with both state authority and the 
concept of “nation,” individuals defined themselves in part through how they interpreted the 
balanced the relation between their power as one “self” versus the power of the state. 
That arrangement of power was not, however, entirely static. Although the Meiji state 
leaders attempted to monopolize violence, their difficulty in gaining complete control over a 
single national identity left room for divergence. The diverse relationships that constitute the self 
and its subjectivity do not engage once and then vanish. They continuously affect those they are 
in contact with. Even relations bound up in political and legal control were flexible.  
Returning to The Wild Geese, Otama learns how to use others from the same relations 
                                               
56 Mori Ōgai, The Wild Geese. Translated by Kingo Ochiai and Sanford Goldstein. 2nd ed.  
(North Clarendon: Tuttle, 2009), 46-7. 
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that used her.  Despite her earlier lamentation of her lack of agency, she figures out how to 
manipulate her place within the community for her own benefit. She learned to “buy” her 
neighbors by exchanging things like food for copybooks to practice writing.57 Additionally, 
Otama ceases to treat Suezō as if she owed him gratitude or affection. That change came after a 
particular realization, “She would be with him in the room, but her real self was detached, 
watching the scene from the side. And there it would deride first Suezo and then the other Otama 
for being under his control.”58  It is important that Otama references a split in her “self.” She 
critiques both Suezō, who has helped define her relation to herself, and the part of her that 
“allows” for that control. Furthermore, Otama identifies that there are different layers of her 
“self.” She is one person, but she contains the traces of different influences. This process is not 
only applicable to Ogai’s novel. It works in regards to national identity. The state affected the 
people’s subjectivity through the relationship between the government and its citizens. The 
Constitution, education policies and other legal institutions defined parts of each individual's 
“self” in relation to the state. However, neither the state nor individuals could claim their identity 
separate from the other.  
One of the most striking scenes of The Wild Geese drives home the connection between 
state authority and individual freedom. The scene centers on a snake forcing itself into a bird 
cage and eating one bird. Ōgai wrote, “...the bird had not been alone. The mate to the one 
fluttering about was trapped in the snake’s mouth.”59 The snake is the creature in control of 
violence, however, it is only able to capture one of the two birds. While the snake holds one bird 
in its mouth, the other bird is still flying around. Just as Otama implied her identity contained 
                                               
57 Ibid, 79 
58 Ibid, 76-7 
59 Ibig, 86-7. 
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multiple parts, the two birds mirror that. Even when part of an individual's identity remains stuck 
in the jaws of state authority, another part of that same identity is the bird that remains uncaught. 
The tensions behind “truth,” “nature,” and the power of the state versus the freedom of the 
individual, made it impossible for the Meiji state to completely swallow the real multiplicity of 
national identity. 
The clarity of conflict as a theme in literature shows that the modern condition was not 
simply the creation of a modern state with modern subjects, but the connected process founded 
on fighting over questions of what makes a public, how does the State exert control, and what 
type of “truth” exists when everything sits on a moving foundation. Trying to create any sort of 
true identity relies on the inherent disagreement and diversity of forces pushing and pulling on 
each other. The universality that Meiji state leaders tried to find with their policies was never the 
singular identity they depicted, rather, the universal was the plurality of tensions and forces. 
V. Final Connections  
 The plurality that appeared in everything from politics to literature created a condition 
where all the possible outcomes, future fascism or otherwise, were a part of the same coin. One 
can flip that coin over and over again and get different results because of the dynamic nature of 
the tensions under the surface of the making of a modern nation-state. The continuity from 
Charter Oath of 1868 through the early twentieth-century novels of Ōgai and Sōseki did not stem 
from the unanimous triumph of one national identity, or a linear progression towards 
“modernity.” Instead, what remained consistent were the questions asked and the debates fought.  
The presumption of Meiji state leaders that a national essence was vital to progress 
carried with it a tangled network of ideologies and counter-ideologies. What does “nation” mean 
to the individual? How do freedom and authority exist together? What function does claiming 
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any sort of truth-based knowledge serve when truth itself is not simply objective, but subjective 
as well? These questions underscored the challenges inherent in crafting a modern nation-state. 
The fighting that went into answering those questions consisted of fighting with opposing views 
more so than fighting against. For example, state policy intended to cultivate faithful subjects 
emerged alongside the alternative subjectivities that the state wanted to suppress.60  Wrestling 
over what constituted an ideal Japanese subject relied on alternative versions of that subject to 
conceptualize what the ideal identity of citizens should look like. The Charter Oath of 1868 
relied on the practices and policies of the Tokugawa Bakufu as a point of contrast to define the 
emergence of the Meiji state. The Constitution of 1889 relied on friction between individuals and 
the state to insert itself as a bridge between the two. The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) 
needed differing opinions on morality and knowledge to assert state leaders’ version as the 
correct interpretation.  
It may sound counterintuitive that the state-building process required tension, but the 
creation of the modern nation-state rests on navigating the relationship between state authority 
and individual freedom. The Meiji state legitimated itself both through its harnessing of power 
and violence, and its promotion of individual rights and freedoms. These two sides are inherently 
contradictory, yet they both served as foundations of the modern nation-state. The conflict 
between individual and state, single or multiple, and truth and the absence of it created the 
conversation that actually built what it meant to be a Japanese subject in the Meiji Era. Without 
the plurality of voices, there would not have been the driving force required to create the 
dynamic state of national and individual identity. Politicians, intellectuals, authors, and the 
general public each contributed to those identities because they worked within the sphere of 
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thought. Political policy responded to the needs of the state for unity, but in doing so sparked 
opposition. Intellectual debate challenged how one defines the public in service of the nation, 
and how truth and morality converge in support or resistance of that definition. Literature 
mirrored the conflicts of lived-experience in a manner that highlighted how the foundations of 
nation and identity are relational. Not only were politics, intellectualism, and literature 
connected, they all embodied different sides of the same dialogue that defined the transitions of 
the Meiji period.  
Additional research concerning public responses would further how one understands the 
relationship between public and nation. This project focused specifically on the interplay of 
forces within Japan to demonstrate how plurality is the foundation of the nation-state, but another 
possibility for further work is a greater focus on international relations. The foundation of the 
modern nation-state is too often taken for granted, and exposing the different layers and 
contradictions within it allows one to analyze how the relationship between public and state 
changes and develops throughout different periods and conditions. It is this relationship that 
continues to inform the interaction between people, community, and nation around the globe in 
the present moment.  
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Yates, Charles L. "Saigō Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan." Modern Asian Studies 28,  
 no. 3.1994. 
